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Abstract
Inter- and intra-family transfers are a very important part of our
daily economic activity. These transfers, whether familial or public,
may inﬂuence our economic decisions to the same extent that ﬁnancial
markets do. In this paper, we seek to understand how the Spanish
stock of capital will evolve if the set of intergenerational transfers ob-
served in year 2000 are maintained in the future. With that aim in
mind, we have implemented a general equilibrium overlapping genera-
tions model with realistic public and familial transfers drawn from the
National Transfer Accounts project (NTA). Given that familial trans-
fers go from parents to children, and public transfers go from children
to parents, we show that the Spanish baby boom and baby bust will
make the second demographic dividend temporary, and that welfare
will be reduced from 2040 onwards.
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11 Introduction
The Spanish economy faces one of the most dramatic population aging pro-
cesses of all the developed countries. According to Eurostat population pro-
jections, the old-age dependency ratio in Spain will go from 24.55% in year
2007 to 65% in year 2050. Will the sharp increase in this ratio be burden-
some for future workers? The answer to this question is: “Not necessarily”.
In contrast to dependent children, retirees may ﬁnance their consumption
with their own capital. The increasing number of retirees with savings, fol-
lowed by smaller cohorts of workers, may lead to capital deepening, which
is also known in the economic literature as the second demographic dividend
(Mason and Lee, 2006). As a result, workers are able to ﬁnance retirement
beneﬁts more easily, since they become more productive, even when human
capital investments remain unchanged. However, unless the necessary in-
centives for accumulating capital are in place, there will not be a second
demographic dividend, and the economic e ects will be negative instead of
positive.
Mainly in response to the decline in savings rate after the postwar pe-
riod in the U.S., the literature has studied extensively the mechanisms for
stimulating the accumulation of capital(Gokhale et al., 1996). We know
from this literature that population aging, which is the combined result of
mortality reduction for old age groups followed by a decrease in fertility,
should a priori lead to a greater capital accumulation. Indeed, assuming
the retirement age remains constant, increases in life expectancy after re-
tirement should boost the motivation to save for retirement, while smaller
family sizes should reduce overall childrearing costs to parents, thereby in-
creasing the ability to save. Nevertheless, non-marketable transfers might
either increase or decrease savings, boosting or o setting the positive eco-
nomic e ects of population aging. The net e ect depends on the di erence
between the size of the transfers individuals will receive, and how much they
will have to pay over the course of their remaining lifespan (Willis, 1988); or,
equivalently, how much wealth individuals will demand to satisfy their con-
sumption needs relative to the existing stock of capital (Lee, 1994; Bommier
and Lee, 2003). If individuals expect to receive more transfers than they
give during their lifetimes, they will deplete capital. For this reason, models
that do not introduce transfers might lead to di erent results (Kotliko  and
Summers, 1981). In order to explain the accumulation of capital over time, it
is therefore critical to specify current and future population characteristics,
marketable transfers, and non-marketable public and private transfers.
In this paper, we aim to understand how the Spanish stock of capital
will evolve if the set of intergenerational transfers observed in year 2000
are maintained in the future. To control for changes in production fac-
tor prices, we implement an overlapping generations model, adding realistic
public and familial transfers by single years of age. In order to keep the
2observed transfer proﬁles, we take them as given by assuming non-perfectly
altruistic agents. Thus far, the implementation of OLG growth models to
elaborate the stock of wealth has been di cult due to the lack of age pro-
ﬁles for non-marketable variables. To bridge this gap, the National Transfer
Accounts Project (NTA) has made available estimates of marketable and
non-marketable inter-age ﬂows that are consistent with National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA).1 A ﬁrst attempt to derive age-speciﬁc infor-
mation was made using Generational Accounts (GA), which were developed
to assess the ﬁscal burden that current generations are placing on future
generations (Auerbach et al., 1991). The GA provides information on in-
tergenerational public transfers, but it lacks information on familial trans-
fers, which is crucial for understanding the accumulation of savings in OLG
models (Sanchez-Romero, 2009). To complement GA, NTA has developed a
“cross-sectional” accounting framework for analyzing how public and private
consumption are ﬁnanced over the life cycle.
This work is the ﬁrst general equilibrium OLG model that uses the NTA
data. Because the NTA database provides inter-age ﬂows of both public
and familial transfers, we are able to produce both market and non-market
transfers by age and over time that are consistent with the OLG and the
NTA models, and, therefore, with National Accounts. To take advantage of
all the rich demographic information by single years of age, we have realis-
tically modeled the Spanish demography (see Appendix A.1 for a detailed
explanation of the methodology). The calibration procedure has been devel-
oped so as to simultaneously target the NTA age proﬁles, the main Spanish
macroeconomic statistics, and the Spanish government budget in year 2000.2
Hence, this paper di ers from other general equilibrium OLG models applied
to the Spanish economy in that we introduce the whole set of familial and
public transfers by age in a realistic fashion (R´ ıos-Rull, 2001; Rojas, 2005;
D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez and D´ ıaz-Saavedra, 2009; Sanchez-Martin, 2010).
In line with previous literature, we show how population aging will cause
an increase in payroll taxes and a subsequent decrease in disposable income.
We estimate that, in 2040, the decrease in disposable income will be 17.1%,
against an assumed 1.26% annual increase in labor-augmenting technolog-
ical progress. Strikingly, we also ﬁnd that aggregate consumption and the
stock of e ective capital will increase signiﬁcantly up to 2040. However, this
positive economic scenario will be temporary. Indeed, we found that the ad-
ditional accumulation of e ective capital will be depleted, ﬁrst because baby
boomers will not save enough, due to the generous pensions they can expect
to receive relative to what they have contributed; and, second, because the
baby bust generation will consume too much, since they will not have an
incentive to save given the large amounts of inter-vivos transfers that they
1National Transfer Account database (NTA), http://www.ntaccounts.org.
2For space sake we have opted for placing the calibration procedure in Appendix A.
3expect to receive from their parents.
The remainder of the paper is divided into ﬁve parts. Given the novelty
of the NTA database and the peculiarities of its accounting strategy, we de-
vote Sections 2 and 3 to introducing the NTA methodology in a simple four
overlapping generations setup. The former section presents the similarities
between the standard ﬂow budget constraint used in OLG models and the
one used in NTA, and shows how to transform one into the other. The
latter section introduces the concepts of the demand for wealth, which in-
cludes transfers wealth. Section 4 shows the speciﬁc features of our general
equilibrium model with 101 overlapping generations. Section 5 presents our
simulation results for the Spanish economy. Finally, we place the calibration
of the model, as well as the algorithm, in the Appendix.
2 OLG meets NTA
The overlapping generations model developed by Samuelson (1958) and Di-
amond (1965) is currently the theoretical workhorse for analyzing the inter-
generational trading of goods and services. Its micro-foundation lies in the
life cycle theory of saving, and the model enables us to examine outcomes
by age in both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal fashion. In building this
simulation model, we make use of the standard Samuelson-Diamond model,
and we introduce the necessary arrangements for transforming the ﬂow bud-
get constraint, which is frequently used in the OLG models, into the NTA
ﬂow identity.3
The NTA identity aims to reﬂect the reallocation of economic resources
across di erent age groups to ﬁnance the life cycle deﬁcit (LCD). We deﬁne
LCD as the di erence between consumption (public and private) and gross
labor income.4 We will demonstrate below that this deﬁnition is adequate
for analyzing the mechanism through which resources are allocated, i.e.,
marketable and non-marketable transfers; as well as the institutions involved
in the transfers, such as households, the public sector, or markets.
For simplicity, in Sections 2 and 3 we assume a stable population com-
prised of four generations, and a closed economy in a steady-state equilib-
rium.
3See Willis (1988) for a ﬁrst attempt to include exogenous family transfers in the OLG
framework. See also Lee (1994) for an application estimating the size of transfer and real
wealth in the United States.
4This deﬁnition of life cycle deﬁcit di ers from Kotliko  and Summers (1981). Recall
that, by estimating savings from lifetime income and (only) private consumption data,
the authors indirectly measured the relevance of intergenerational transfers on capital
accumulation; see Lee (1994).
42.1 OLG ﬂow budget constraints
We assume the ﬁrst and last cohorts are children and retirees, respectively,
and that parents and children are one generation apart. We assume that
children leave their parents’ home when they belong to generation one, set-
ting up their own household. After the children are settled, the parents do
not directly ﬁnance their children’s consumption needs, although they may
continue to transfer economic resources.
Let asset holdings of a representative individual of age x be ax. At
any given age x  {1,2,3}, asset holding at age x + 1 is the result of the
capitalization, net of taxes, of previous and inherited asset holdings, plus net
earnings, plus net received transfers, less consumption of the economic unit
at market prices. We may assume that, realistically, children do not make
any economic decisions. Therefore, parents ﬁnance children’s consumption
needs until they become adults. Assuming that both market and non-market
exchanges occur at the end of the period, asset holdings for each adult
generation may be written as follows:
a2 = (1 + (1    i)r)(a1 + h1) + (1    i)(1    ss)yl1 +  1   (1 +  p) 1c1, (1)
a3 = (1 + (1    i)r)(a2 + h2) + (1    i)(1    ss)yl2 +  2   (1 +  p) 2c2, (2)
a4 = (1 + (1    i)r)(a3 + h3) + (1    i)b3 +  3   (1 +  p) 3c3, (3)
where cx is consumption at age x, r is the (real) interest rate, { i, ss, p}
is the subset of personal income, payroll, and consumption taxes levied
directly on households, ylx is the (gross) wage at age x, hx is the inheritance
received at age x,  x is the net intervivos family transfers at age x, bx is
public beneﬁts received at age x, and  x is the number of equivalent adult
consumers in the household supported by household head age x.
Flow budget constraints (1)-(3) are, unfortunately, not adequate for ana-
lyzing transfers. First, they do not include all transfers between individuals
and the government; e.g., information about public consumption such as
public education, publicly provided health care, public infrastructure, etc.
Second, they do not include transfers between ﬁrms and the government;
e.g., corporate tax and production subsidies.
2.2 The NTA accounting strategy
In general, children and retirees consume more than they produce, whereas
production is higher than consumption at prime working ages. The sur-
plus generated by workers is partly stored in the ﬁnancial sector as a bu er
stock; partly levied by the government to provide goods, services, and bene-
ﬁts; and partly transferred within and outside the household to support the
consumption of other age groups. In order to illustrate explicitly these life
cycle decisions, NTA split each ﬂow budget constraint into four accounting
items: i) the life cycle deﬁcit (LCD), ii) the asset-based reallocation (ABR),
5iii) public transfers (TG), and iv) familial transfers (TF). The NTA funda-
mental equation is then given as
LCDx = ABRx + TGx + TFx. (4)
Each accounting item represents a ﬂow variable, where positive (negative)
values are associated to net recipients (givers). First, LCD measures the
di erence between (public and private) goods and services consumed, and
the value of goods and services produced by age. Thus, a cohort who produce
more (less) than they consume will have a negative (positive) LCD. Second,
transfers are divided into public and private: TG stands for public and TF
for private net transfers received directly or indirectly by individuals.5 Since
total transfers given (outﬂow) equals total transfers received (inﬂow), at an
aggregate level in a closed economy, both public and private transfers must
net to zero; i.e.6
3  
x=0
TGxNx+1 =0 , (5)
3  
x=0
TFxNx+1 =0 . (6)
In order to satisfy Equation (5), we impute public consumption (g) and
corporate taxes to individuals. Hence note that TG is then the ﬂip side of
GA. To keep the formulae simple, we assume that corporate taxes are paid
by individuals according to their asset holdings,
 c r +  
1    cK =  c r +  
1    c
3  
x=1
(ax + hx)Nx+1, (7)
where  c is the corporate tax rate,   is the capital depreciation rate, and
hx is the bequests received at age x.7 Similarly, to satisfy Equation (6),
it is necessary to introduce the bequest given (outﬂow) in the ﬂow budget
constraint, since at an aggregate level, bequests received must be balanced
by bequests given (see Equations (12)-(13) below).
5As NTA assumes the individual is the fundamental unit, net transfers received by
ﬁrms from the government are also imputed to individuals.
6In an open economy the sum of all private transfers is equal to the value of net transfers
with the rest of the world.
7Since parents and children are one generation apart and transfers occur at the end of
the period, the inheritance at age x is
hx =
(
ax+1qx+1 for x = {1,2},
0 for x =3 .
(8)
Where qx is the probability of dying from age x to age x + 1. See Appendix A.7.2 for a
more realistic inheritance proﬁle.
6Finally, ABR measures the use of ﬁnancial and real assets to ﬁnance
current and future LCDs, which is equal to asset income less savings. Asset
income can be decomposed into the interest gained by those who survived
up to the end of the period, and that of those who died during the period.8
Another important feature of the NTA accounting framework is that it is
consistent with national income and product accounts (NIPA), and, thus,
















      
0
, (9)
which, by rearranging the terms, is equal to the market-clearing condition
C + G + S = rK + ylL. (10)
where C and G are aggregate private and public consumption, S is the
aggregate net savings, K =
 3
x=1 axNx is the stock of physical capital, and
L =
 2
x=1 Nx is the labor force.
2.3 NTA ﬂow budget constraints
The accumulation of capital over time, and thus economic growth, depends
on how much wealth individuals demand relative to the existing stock of
capital. The demand for wealth is determined not only by adults (decision-
makers) but also by children (non-decision-makers). In overlapping gener-
ations models, the budget constraint of a non-decision-maker is not explic-
itly modeled. Instead, children’s resources and expenditures are taken into
account in the budget constraints of adults. As a result, ﬂow budget con-
straints, such as (1)-(3), turn out to be a poor accounting framework for
analyzing the e ect that transfers to children have on economic growth. To
ﬁx this problem, in this subsection we introduce the NTA ﬂow budget con-
straint and its main components for each cohort, regardless whether they
make decisions.
We start with the assumption that children do not work until they be-
come adults. Consequently, their LCD is positive and equal to private and
public consumption. Provided that children neither hold assets, so that
their ABR are equal to zero; nor make any economic decisions, their life
cycle deﬁcit is only ﬁnanced through private and public transfers, as shown
below
c0 + g0       
LCD0
= g0     
TG0
+ 0c1     
TF0
, (11)
8Current estimates of NTA proﬁles do not explicitly report bequests given. As a
consequence, the ABR proﬁle implicitly includes bequests received (h). This fact implies
that if bequest motive is important, ABR will be higher than expected at younger ages.
7where  0 is the consumption of children relative to the consumption of an
adult who belongs to generation one.9 Values for g0 and  0 in Spain in the
year 2000 are shown in Figure 12 in Appendix A.4. Figure 12 suggests that
transfers to a child account for more than 50% of the consumption of an
adult between the ages 30 and 49. Unfortunately, many economic models
analyzing the accumulation of capital lack this information, and thus their
consumption and saving proﬁles ultimately lead to ﬂawed results.
Equation (12) is the NTA ﬂow budget constraint of a worker. In general,
the surplus at working ages (LCD<0) will be used to ﬁnance other cohorts’
life cycle deﬁcits, mainly through transfers. From a public perspective, this
means that workers pay more taxes than the sum of public expenditures
and beneﬁts received. Hence, workers are net providers of public goods and
services to other age groups. From the familial perspective, individuals at
prime working ages raise their children, and, if there are no public pensions,
they also ﬁnance the consumption of retirees. Thus, both public and familial
transfers have an important e ect on the accumulation of capital. Assuming
selﬁsh individuals, we will have the following e ects. On the one hand,
transfers given to other age groups reduce savings at prime working ages.
On the other hand, transfers may a ect saving by changing the level of
consumption.
The di erence between LCD and the sum of public and private transfers
is the ABR. According to the life cycle theory of saving, we should expect
to see negative values at the beginning of the working period, and positive
values when individuals get closer to retirement. Nevertheless, the ABR
proﬁle could change depending upon the importance of transfers to children
and retirees, as well as the altruistic behavior towards other cohorts.
cx + gx   ylx       
LCDx




      
ABRx
+gx    i (r(ax + hx) + (1    ss)ylx)    ssylx    p xcx    c r +  
1    c(ax + hx)
      
TGx
+ (1 + r)hx   (1 + r)
qx
px
ax +  x   ( x   1)cx
      
TFx
, (12)
where px is the probability of surviving from age x to age x + 1 and qx its
complementary; that is, px + qx = 1.
Retirees have a positive LCD since they do not work. But, unlike chil-
dren, retirees’ positive LCD can be ﬁnanced not only through public and pri-
9A more realistic child rearing costs, as that introduced in Section 4, depends on the
average consumption of the parent.
8vate transfers, but also through assets. The importance of assets in Equation
(13) is key for analyzing the e ect that population aging has on the accumu-
lation of capital. The economic e ect is positive whenever the proportion
of ABR ﬁnancing LCD is high, since it enhances the second demographic
dividend. But the economic e ect turns negative when the proportion of
ABR ﬁnancing LCD is small, since the second demographic dividend be-
comes temporary. However, there are other important reasons for ﬁnancing
the LCD of the elderly through transfers, such as the reduction of inequal-
ity and the improvement of welfare in response to market ine ciencies, like
borrowing constraints (Diamond, 1977).
c3 + g3       
LCD3




      
ABR3
+ g3 + b3    i (r(a3 + h3)+b3)    p 3c3    c r +  
1    c(a3 + h3)
      
TG3
+ (1 + r)h3   (1 + r)
q3
p3
a3 +  3   ( 3   1)c3
      
TF3
. (13)
Except for those countries where elderly parents cohabit with their children
(e.g., Taiwan, Thailand, and, to a lesser extent, South Korea), cross-country
comparisons suggest that assets and public transfers dominate familial trans-
fers in the ﬁnancing of retirees’ LCD (Lee and Mason, 2010b). Lee and
Mason (2010b) have also found that, in countries where the pension beneﬁt
system is generous, ABR represents less than 40% of the LCD, and vice
versa. However, this does not mean that the retirees are dissaving. On the
contrary, according to the Spanish NTA results, the elderly are saving to
make inter-vivos, and, most likely, post-mortem transfers. Thus, provided
retirees’ children are not part of the household, retirees make downward
inter-household transfers, i.e,  3 < 0, and thus  1, 2 > 0.
3 From transfers to capital
This section is devoted to explaining how changes in transfers a ect the
accumulation of capital. According to the life cycle model, asset holdings
at any given age (or demand for real wealth) is the present value of the
remaining lifetime expenditures, less the present value of the remaining life-
time income (including transfers). The demand for life cycle wealth at any
given age is, by contrast, the present value of the remaining lifetime of own
consumption (public and private), less the present value of the remaining
marginal product of labor. Both demands are easily formulated using the
9NTA framework. The demand for real wealth at age x can be calculated as
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Note that the discount factor naturally arises from discounting the NTA
ﬂow budget constraints of the cohort. Equation (15) is related to (14) using
the NTA identity (4) as follows:








= ax + tx. (16)
where  s is total transfers at age s, TGs + TFs, and tx is the demand for
transfer wealth or the present value, evaluated at age x, of the remaining
lifetime public and familial transfers.
At an aggregate level, the demand for life cycle wealth can be obtained
by multiplying wx by the number of people at each age. Summing Equation










txNx = K + T, (17)
where K is the aggregate supply of capital by households (or aggregate
demand for real wealth) and T is the aggregate demand for transfer wealth.10
As a particular case, we have that K is the stock of physical capital if, and
only if, the economy is closed; otherwise, K will be asset holdings by people
in the country.
The comparison between the aggregate demand for real wealth (K) and
the aggregate demand for life cycle wealth (W) gives us insight into the
excess, or deﬁcit, of aggregate lifetime consumption over ﬁnancial and hu-
man capital,11 where human capital is deﬁned as the present value, survival
10For the deﬁnition of T and K we follow Willis (1988) and Lee (1994).
11The demand for life cycle wealth by an individual at age x equals the present value,
survival weighted, of the stream of public and private consumption less human capital.
Let the present value of consumption and human capital be denoted by ˜ c and ˜ Hx. Then,
the intertemporal budget constraint is given by
wx =˜ cx   ˜ Hx = ax + tx   ˜ cx = ˜ Hx + ax + tx. (18)
Thus, for ˜ cx > (<) ˜ Hx + ax it is necessary that tx > (<)0.
10weighted, of the stream of gross salaries. If W is greater than K, the current
population are on average, net receivers of transfers (T>0), which allow
them to have a higher rate of consumption, assuming the stock of capital
remains the same. The opposite is also true when T<0. Whether T is
equal to, greater than, or lower than zero depends upon both demographics
and institutional arrangements. See Figure 1 for an illustration. Panel 1(a)
shows the demands for total and real wealth under two di erent populations
with similar institutional arrangements, while by holding the population age
structure constant, Panel 1(b) shows an economy with two di erent sets of
transfers.
In Panel 1(a), the demands for real and life cycle wealth of a population
with high fertility and high mortality (pre-demographic transition) are rep-
resented by the small letters ss and ww. Meanwhile, the capital letters SS
and WW stand for the demands for real and life cycle wealth of a population
with low fertility and low mortality (post-demographic transition).
Assuming that production technology does not change over time, the
market interest rate is set when the demand for capital by ﬁrms, or curve
DD, crosses the aggregate demand for real wealth by individuals; these
are points a or b, depending upon the demographic scenario. For any given
interest rate, we can see that the demand for real wealth SS is always greater
than ss. This is because, in the former economy, individuals live longer and
are motivated to save more for retirement. As a result, assuming the set
of transfers does not change, economies with longer life expectancies will










































Figure 1: Aggregate Demand for Real and Total Wealth (with borrowing
constraints and selﬁsh individuals).
11In equilibrium, transfer wealth is given by the segments ac (T<0)
and bd (T>0), respectively. Transfer wealth has opposite signs in each
equilibrium, because in economies where fertility is high (such as point a),
the highest cost is usually associated with childrearing, which leads adults to
give more than they receive through their remaining lifetime. In contrast, in
economies with both low mortality and low fertility, like point b, childrearing
costs are overtaken by transfers received when retired. Hence, adults become
(net) receivers of transfers.
In Panel 1(b), in contrast, we illustrate a population (post-demographic
transition) with two di erent pension systems. The ﬁrst case corresponds
to an economy with generous pension beneﬁts, with an equilibrium that is
depicted by point b. A second case is represented by the equilibrium e,
in which there are no pension beneﬁts. As in Panel 1(a), transfer wealth
has opposite signs in each equilibrium. This is because the reduction of
pension beneﬁts increases personal savings (Feldstein, 1974), assuming the
age of retirement remains the same. Therefore, the demand for real wealth
is shifted to the right from curve SS to curve S S . In the new equilibrium
e, transfer wealth is negative since transfers from parents to children are
maintained and public transfers to retirees are diminished. Thus, individuals
become net transfer givers throughout their lifetime, segment ei (T<0).
The illustration in Figure 1 leads us to the main issue addressed in this
Section: What is the impact of a transfer change into capital? The sign
and the level of a transfer change on capital depend on the di erence be-
tween the average age of recipients and givers, as well as on the amount
transferred. Thus, if additional transfers go from children to parents (for
example moving from equilibrium e to d in Panel 1(b)), the demand for real
wealth will decrease, because old age consumption will be ﬁnanced by trans-
fers rather than by savings. Moreover, higher transfers to the elderly will
yield a greater crowding-out of capital. On the other hand, if transfers are re-
duced -for example, from equilibrium d to e- the opposite argument applies.
Throughout the demographic transition, however, the e ect of transfers on
capital will vary according to the leading generation in the economy; i.e.,
the baby boomer or the baby bust generation. Section 5 will show these
e ects along the transition.
4 The model economy
In this section, we present the model economy used to estimate the demand
for total and real wealth in Spain. All the information on the Spanish life-
cycle deﬁcit, asset-based reallocation, and public and private transfers is
taken from the NTA for Spain for the year 2000. These age proﬁles provide
us with insight into how Spanish households reallocate their earnings across
di erent age groups. In order to estimate the demand for real, total, and
12transfer wealth in any year t we would need the LCD, ABR, TG, and TF by
age from year t, until all living cohorts in that year have died. However, only
estimates for the year 2000 are available. There are two main approaches
for tackling this problem. The ﬁrst is by using ‘economic’ synthetic cohorts,
where NTA age proﬁles remain unchanged over time (Lee and Mason, 2010b;
Patxot et al., 2010; Bixby and Robles, 2008). This methodology provides
useful but restrictive information, in the sense that individuals do not change
their savings behavior with changes in prices. This drawback is addressed
using a general equilibrium OLG model, which is the methodology applied
in this paper. A third possibility is to use a partial equilibrium model, or
a mixture of the above-mentioned techniques. Although partial equilibrium
is not as restrictive as the synthetic cohort technique, changes in aggregate
savings do not a ect factor prices, which leads to an overestimation of both
positive and negative e ects.
Our economy is comprised of public and private sectors, which in turn
consist of a government, one neoclassical ﬁrm, and a ﬁnite number of do-
mestic units. The economy is assumed to be closed to foreign capital invest-
ments, but not to foreign labor. Each economic unit will be represented by
a set of ﬂows, which are summarized in Table 1. See an extended version,
including data sources, in Appendix C.
Table 1: Modeled National Transfer Accounts by Flow and Economic Agent
Individual Government Firm
Salary Progressive Income Tax Revenues
Asset Income Indirect Tax
Familial Transfers Corporate Tax
Inﬂows Public Consumption Payroll Tax
Public Beneﬁts
Bequests
Consumption Pensions Beneﬁts Salaries
Childrearing Widowhood Beneﬁts Asset Income
Familial Transfers Maternity Beneﬁts Corporate Tax
Outﬂows Taxes Public Health Net Investment
Saving Public Education
Bequests Public Others
4.1 The domestic economic unit
Each domestic unit is assumed to be comprised of one adult and a number
of young dependents. The economic unit can, therefore, be thought of as a
regular household split into two, in which two adults live with their children.
13For simplicity, we assume that there is no age di erence between the spouses,
and that both spouses can accumulate assets.12 As a consequence, economic
resources are allocated equally between both partners.
A new economic unit is assumed to be set up when an individual is 21
years old (Tw), the age at which children become adults and start making
decisions in our model. However, when an adult dies, the economic unit van-
ishes. From that moment onwards, her/his surviving children (orphans) will
be borne by a di erent household with similar characteristics. To compen-
sate for the additional burden, the new household receives the asset holdings
from the adult.
We assume that there is no annuity market, and that our individuals do
not save with a bequest motive in mind. Thus, individuals may leave an
accidental bequests at death (Yaari, 1965, Case A). In line with Sanchez-
Romero (2009), we assume that adults make decisions for their own well-
being, as well as for the well-being of their children; i.e., that the utility of
raising children is proportional to their consumption. We also assume that
all household heads have identical additive instantaneous preferences, which












where   is the maximum longevity,   is the constant-relative-risk-aversion
12Although we assume here that there are no inter-spouse transfers, the NTA database
includes this information.
13An alternative approach could be to maximize the expected utility of the average
consumer in the household (Tobin, 1967; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; R´ ıos-Rull, 2001).
By doing so, this expected utility function implies that consumption smoothing takes place
at the household level, rather than at the individual level. To illustrate this point, let us
assume the following standard household problem without transfers,
Vx(ax) =max
cx
{u(cx/ x)+ Vx+1(ax+1)}, (19)
s.t. ax+1 =(1 + r)ax + ylx   cx, for x  {Tw,...,    1},
where cx is now the total household consumption with a household head of age x.
Assuming a logarithmic instantaneous utility function and substituting the ﬂow budget












Di erentiating with respect to ax+1 and using the envelope theorem gives the Euler equa-
tion
cx+1 = cx (1 + r). (21)
Equation (21) implies that household saving does not change over the lifespan for a con-
stant household labor income stream, even when the number of equivalent adult consumers
in the household increases. However, a cross-country comparison of consumption proﬁles
using NTA data suggests that households do not smooth their consumption when are
childrearing costs.
14coe cient,     (0,1] is the subjective discount factor, pt,x is the probability
of surviving from age x to age x+1 in year t,  t,x is the number of equivalent
adult consumers within an economic unit whose head is x years old, and ct,x
is the consumption of private goods and services of the head of the economic
unit.
Individuals receive income from three sources. First, the ﬁrm compen-
sates its labor force in the form of salaries and pays interest on their assets.
The labor force is supplied inelastically only from age 21 (Tw) to age 63 (Tr).
The salary by age ylt,x is a function of the marginal product of the e ective
labor  t, the technological progress At, the e ective labor units supplied  x,
and the probability of being employed at that age 1 ut,x. Second, they re-
ceive inter-vivos transfers from their parents ( +
t,x) and accidental bequests
(ht,x) when their parents die. Third, the government provides pension bene-
ﬁts (bt,x) if they have a child, become a widow/er, or are retired. All pension
beneﬁts are assumed to be funded through a PAYG system ( ss
t ylt,x).
In order to ﬁnance public consumption (health, education, and other
public expenditures), the government levies taxes on the following market
transfers: consumption of private goods and services ( 
p







t,x +(1  ss
t )ylt,x]), where B is the set
of all public beneﬁts, and corporate proﬁts. Let denote the consumption of
public goods and services at age x in year t by gt,x. The disposable income
is then used to pay the consumption of the economic unit ( t,xct,x), to
transfer income to their adult o spring (  
t,x), and to save (at+1,x+1 at,x).14
Therefore, the ﬂow budget constraint of an adult at age x in year t is given
by
(1 +  
p
t ) t,xct,x +   
t,x + at+1,x+1 = (1 + rt(1    i
t,x))(at,x + ht,x))
+ (1    i








where rt is the after-corporate tax (real) interest rate. Although (23) is
better for solving the decision problem, in our case it is more convenient
to calculate the inter-temporal budget constraint, as in NTA. To do so, we
ﬁrst have to discount the ﬂow budget constraints as if an actuarial note had
been purchased; and, second, we have to add all transfers except for those
that are directly paid by the ﬁrm to the government, such as corporate tax.
14For the sake of space the speciﬁc formula applied to each transfer has been placed in
Appendix A
15Thus,









gt+s x,s + ct+s x,s   ylt+s x,s
 
= at,x +








 t+s x,s, (24)
where  t,x is total (net) non-market transfers at age x in year t. Note
that, in Equation (24), the ﬁrst term on the left-hand-side corresponds to
the demand for life cycle wealth by the individual and the second term on
the right-hand-side to transfer wealth by the individual. If we denote the
actuarial value of stock of human wealth at age x in year t by ˜ Ht,x and the
individual transfer wealth at age x in year t by tt,x, then we can rewrite
Equation (24) as follows








(gt+s x,s + ct+s x,s)   ˜ Ht,x = at,x + tt,x. (25)
The optimal consumption of an adult will be given by the usual decision
problem. Thus, it can be shown that the ﬁrst order condition of maximizing
(22) subject to (23) and the boundary conditions at,Tw = 0, at,x   0, for any












 pt+1,x+1(1 + rt+1(1    i
t+1,x+1)), (26)
with equality i  at,x > 0.
It is noteworthy that, for a given set of future interest rates, salaries,
and demographic characteristics, we can see how consumption at age Tw
depends on the transfer system established by substituting (26) into (25).
Thus, an individual who has negative transfer wealth (tt,x < 0) would, all
other things being equal, consume less over her or his lifespan, which implies
a lower demand for life cycle wealth. The opposite is also true with a positive
transfer wealth (tt,x > 0).
4.2 The ﬁrm
We model a neoclassical ﬁrm using a Cobb-Douglas production function
F(Kt,A tLt)=K 
t (AtLt)1  , where   is the capital share; K is the capital
stock, which under a closed economy is
Kt =
   
x=Tw
at,xNt,x; (27)
16A is the labor-augmenting technological progress; and L is the total units
of labor
Lt =
Tr 1  
x=Tw
 x(1   ut,x)Nt+1,x+1. (28)
Following Hassett and Hubbard (2002), after paying corporate taxes, the
net cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm (without investment tax credit) is given by
Xt = (1    c
t )(F(Kt,A tLt)    tAtLt)   It,
where  c
t is the corporate tax rate and It is gross investment.








The optimality conditions are given by
 tAt = FL(Kt,A tLt) (29)
rt +   = FK(Kt,A tLt) · (1    c
t ) (30)
It = Kt+1   Kt(1    ) (31)
where   is the capital depreciation rate.
4.3 Government
We model a government that has two separate balanced budgets. On the
one side, given that the Spanish Social Security administration runs a quasi
deﬁned beneﬁt unfunded pension system, we assume that the payroll tax is
chosen so as to balance the budget of the pension system,






t,xNt+1,x+1 =  ss
t
Tr 1  
x=Tw
ylt,xNt+1,x+1. (32)
On the other side, the government provides public goods and services such
as health, education, and others that are ﬁnanced through personal income
taxes, corporate taxes, and taxes on consumption,






t,xNt+1,x+1 =  
p
t
  1  
x=0
 t,xct,xNt+1,x+1 +  c
t
rt +  















t,x + rt(at,x + ht,x)
 
 Nt+1,x+1, (33)
where J is the set of public forms consumption.
All tax rates are assumed to be ﬂat, except for the personal income
tax rate, which is progressive. This allow us to better measure transfers of
17wealth and savings, since both variables are age-dependent. Unfortunately,
by modeling a progressive personal income tax proﬁle with non-risky assets,
we cannot introduce public debt; otherwise, we could not satisfy the non-
arbitrage on assets condition.15
Finally, to guarantee that Equation (33) is balanced at all times, we
assume that any change in aggregate public consumption that is not cov-
ered by personal income taxes and corporate income taxes will be ﬁnanced
through indirect taxes.
4.4 Equilibrium
Let x  X and t  T . In this economy a Competitive Equilibrium with
Transfers is a list of sequences of quantities ct,x, at,x, Nt,x, At, Lt, Kt, prices
 t, rt, taxes  
p




c ,  i
t,x, public beneﬁts {b
j
t,x}j B, public consumptions
{g
j
t,x}j J, and private transfers ht,x,   
t,x,  +
t,x,(  t,x   1)ct,x such that, at
each point in time t:
(i) the ﬁrm maximizes its value Jt by choosing Kt,L t, and It according
to (29)-(31),
(ii) individuals maximize their expected lifetime utility (22) subject to
(23),
(iii) both government budget constraints (32) and (33) are satisﬁed,
(iv) both capital and labor market clearing conditions (27) and (28) hold,
(v) total private transfers given equal total private transfers received,
(vi) and the good market clearing condition is satisﬁed,
F(Kt,A tLt)+Kt(1    )
= Kt+1 +







  1  
x=Tw
 t,xct,xNt+1,x+1. (34)
Note this last condition is equivalent to (9). Moreover, the total consumption
in the economy, including children’s consumption, is taken into account in
the last term of the right-hand-side of the Equation.
15Although the increase in public debt with respect to GDP in 2009 is expected to
have an important impact in the short and medium run in interest rates, in the long run
it is likely that a misleading progressive income tax will have a stronger e ect on the
accumulation of capital.
185 The estimation of the Spanish demand for wealth
Figure 2 illustrates with blue circles the LCD of Spain in 2000. This implies
that 21.5 million people (53.5% of the Spanish population) consumed more
than they produced in 2000. In the year 2000, the Spanish life cycle deﬁcit is
positive for the working ages 26 to 58. Nevertheless, the degree of economic
dependency varies with age. As previously mentioned, children are, econom-
ically speaking, the most dependent, since they neither work nor accumulate
assets to ﬁnance their consumption. Their consumption needs are entirely
supported by public transfers (38.2%) and familial transfers (61.8%). By
contrast, the cost of supporting people from age 59 and over is lessened be-
cause they accumulate wealth before retirement. Indeed, in Spain retirees
at age 65 ﬁnance 54% of their LCD with assets.
The Spanish life cycle deﬁcit by age has been calibrated by targeting
the NTA age proﬁles, the main Spanish macroeconomic statistics, and the
Spanish government budget in the year 2000. Figure 2 shows the di erences
between our simulated NTA proﬁles (solid-colored lines) and the actual NTA
data (colored circles) in 2000. The discrepancies between the theoretical
and actual NTA proﬁles can be attributed to the model assumptions. In
our simulations, the sharp increases and decreases at ages 21 and 63 are
due to the assumption that individuals leave their parental home when they
are 21 years old, and retire at age 63. In Spain, the median age at leaving
the parental home was 25.7 years for men and 22.9 years for women in the
early 1990s (Aassve et al., 2002). Provided that in our model both the
individual decision making and demographic characteristics are consistent,
parental emancipation around age 25 would lead to an excess in fertility
between ages 25-49 and, as a consequence, a burden 15 years later that
would unrealistically reduce savings for these age groups. On the other hand,
although a mandatory age of retirement is an unrealistic assumption, the
aim of the paper is not to estimate how the optimal age of retirement evolves
with changes in demography and economic incentives, but to understand the
demand for wealth.16 Thus, in order to keep the model as simple as possible,
we have opted for assuming a constant age of retirement close to the o cial
mean age of retirement in Spain in year 2000.
Another discrepancy between the NTA proﬁles and our simulation re-
sults is that our LCD proﬁle is slightly higher for ages 63 and over. There
are several reasons that may explain the di erence. Among others, our en-
dogenously determined (real) interest rate is high relative to actual data
(around 1% higher), and thus the slope of our consumption proﬁle for the
16This is a very interesting question that has been previously modeled for the Spanish
case by Jimenez-Martin and Sanchez-Martin (2007) to analyze the e ect that minimum
pension beneﬁts has on the optimal age of retirement or by D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez and D´ ıaz-
Saavedra (2009) to study how a change in the mandatory age of retirement a ect the
sustainability of the Spanish pension system.
19elderly is steeper than what the NTA LCD proﬁle shows. However, the
sensitivity analysis test shows that the Euler equation is robust to changes
in both the risk aversion coe cient and the subjective discount factor and,
thereby, a di erent value in either variable cannot explain the discrepancy.
Unlike Gan et al. (2005), an alternative explanation is that elderly people
do not forecast accurately the remaining number-years lived. Indeed, we are
assuming that all the remaining-years lived are healthy years, which could
tilt the consumption at old ages up.
                            
    
    
    
 
   
   
   
   
 






































             
Figure 2: Actual (o) and Simulated (-) Life Cycle Deﬁcit: Spain, year 2000.
There are some features of the Spanish NTA that need to be highlighted.
First, ABR is close to zero up to age 40, and it only counts for 15% of the
average gross labor income from ages 30 to 49 (18,410 euros) until retirement.
Based on the life cycle theory of saving, this proﬁle suggests that there
are important inter-vivos transfers that most likely ﬂow from adult parents
to adult children due to cohabitation and housing subsidies. Second, the
positive ABR from age 40 until retirement occurs because, in 2000, the
cost of childrearing peaks from age 35 to age 50 at the expense of savings.
Moreover, the presence of sizable public transfers for retirement might also
reinforce this e ect. Third, the familial transfer proﬁle is positive for children
and negative for adults. Hence parents are (net) transfer givers to their
o spring through their lifetimes. A cross-country comparison shows that
this is a generalized behavior, except in countries such as Taiwan, South
Korea, and Thailand, where adults ages 65 and over are (net) recipients of
familial transfers (Lee and Mason, 2010b). In contrast, individuals receive
public transfers when they are younger than age 20 or older than age 62.
In 2000, the favorable demographic situation makes it easy to support
20the welfare state, as less than 30% of the average gross labor income from
30-to-49 year-olds is needed to maintain the current public transfer sys-
tem.17 Unfortunately, assuming the current public beneﬁts formulae remain
in force, the simulation results show that the working age population will
have to spend around 20% more of their gross salary to support the welfare
state system in 2050 (see Figure 3 below). Speciﬁcally, the payroll tax in-
creases from 13% in 2000 to 33.5% in 2050 (or equivalently social beneﬁts
represent 7.76% of GDP in 2000 and about 20% of GDP in 2050) and the
production tax rate goes from 11.46% in 2000 to 17% in 2050.
                            
    
    
    
 
   
   
   
   
 






































             
Figure 3: Simulated Life Cycle Deﬁcit: Spain, year 2050.
An increase in the cost of the welfare state in 2050 is not the only change
in the LCD. The change in TF is just as dramatic as the change in public
transfers, as Figure 3 illustrates. Surprisingly, in 2050, TF is positive for the
working age population, except for ages 40 to 52. A closer look at familial
transfers over time (Figure 4) shows that aggregate inter-familial transfer
wealth and aggregate bequests turn positive from 2010 to 2100, even when
they are modeled as downward transfers. To understand this picture, we
need to look at the demographic characteristics of the Spanish population.
People born during the baby bust receive more transfers from their older
family members than they will actually give to their adult o spring; this
is especially true among people who were born in the early 1990s, when
the TFR bottomed out. The opposite is also true for the baby boomers.
This economic e ect is similar to the one described by Easterlin (1980), in
17In fact the total dependency ratio in Spain from the year 2000 to the year 2010 was
the lowest of the last century.
21comparison of the economic fortunes of small cohorts relative to those of
big cohorts. We can see how the small cohort born in the early 1990s raise
interfamilial transfer wealth when they enter the labor market, and up to
the moment when they retire, which is precisely the point at which inter-
familial transfers start to decline. On the other hand, intra-family transfers
do not substantially change over time (i.e., childrearing costs). Thus, by
aggregating all the components of the familial transfer of wealth, we ﬁnd
that the aggregate transfer of wealth is always negative, but close to zero
from 2050 to 2080 (see Figure 5).
                                                                                         
  
    
    
    
    
 
   
   
   
   
 


















                        
                        
        
Figure 4: Simulated Aggregate Familial Transfer Wealth: Spain, 1970-2140.
The result of combining aggregate public and familial transfer wealth
gives a positive transfer wealth for the 21st century, illustrated by the circled
solid line in Figure 5. Consequently, individuals will demand more wealth
than the existing stock of capital. We know that, up to a certain threshold,
if the population is declining, individuals’ demands for life cycle wealth
could exceed the existing stock of capital without depleting it. However,
based on Eurostat projections of annual migrant ﬂows, we have to rule
out this possibility because our projected Spanish population continues to
increase (in e ective units) up to 2020 (see Figure 9 in the Appendix). As
a consequence, the second demographic dividend will not be permanent
(Mason and Lee, 2006), since transfers to the elderly are quite generous and
private transfer wealth is positive. In short, the additional accumulation of
assets because of an extended retirement period (longer life expectancy after
retirement) will not lead to a permanent increase in the capital-to-output
ratio. Our simulations suggest that the capital-to-output ratio will reach
the value of 3 in the 2040s and will progressively decline to a steady level of
22about 2.65.
                                                                                         
    
  
    
 
   
 
   
 
   


















             
                  
                
                
                  
               
Figure 5: Simulated Aggregate Transfer Wealth: Spain, 1970-2140.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the capital market, including the demand
for life cycle wealth. The equilibrium interest rate is represented in the
vertical axe, while the units of e ective capital are on the horizontal axe.
The black solid line corresponds to the supply of capital in equilibrium, or
demand for real wealth, from 1980 to 2140 (when the ﬁnal steady-state is
reached). The blue solid line is the associated demand for life cycle wealth
over time, or the wealth demanded by individuals to satisfy their remaining
lifetime consumption. Taking this into account, for any given year, if the
demand for life cycle wealth exceeds the supply of capital, the population
expect to consume more during their remaining lifetime than the existing
stock of capital allows them to. This is because they expect to be net
receivers of transfers throughout their lifespan (Lee, 1994).
Even though the demand for life cycle wealth exceeds the stock of cap-
ital, the entry of the babyboomers into retirement, who have more capital
accumulated than previous cohorts, will boost the capital stock per worker
up to 2040. The after-tax (real) interest rate will be close to 5% in 2040, and
the productivity of labor will increase at a rate of 1.60% per year from 2010
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Interest Rate and Demand for Wealth (Life Cycle
and Real): Spain, 1980-2140.
to 2040.18 Simultaneously, payroll taxes will rise at a rate of 2.17% per year
during the same period, o setting the gain in labor productivity. Hence,
by maintaining the current Social Security system, disposable income will
decrease by 17.1% (0.57%   30 years) from 2010 to 2040. It is noteworthy
the e ect that the current crisis has on the demand for real and life cycle
wealth from year 2010 to 2020.19 According to Figure 6 the stock of capital
decreases whereas the demand for life cycle wealth remains unchanged. This
is because the generation who were born in the 1990s, with positive total
transfers wealth, do not accumulate savings at the same rate as the growth
rate of employment. Hence, the simulation suggests that the Spanish econ-
omy will need more than a decade to have the same stock per e ective labor
18Holding the technology constant and assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function,











Assuming that at time t + T any variable Xt+T can be expressed according to an initial
value Xt times a constant growth rate gX during T periods, then we ﬁnd that the growth
rate of salaries gw is equal to gA +  gk   1.26% + 0.36 · 0.95%, where the set {gA,g k}
correspond to the growth rate of the labor-augmenting technological progress and the
growth rate of e ective units of capital, respectively.
19We have assumed that the observed employment rates by age in 2010 linearly improve
to the values projected by the European Policy Committee in 2019.
24than before the crisis.
How will the decrease in disposable income a ect the stock of capital?
On the one hand, the stock of e ective capital will fall because of the de-
crease in disposable income, and the accompanying decline in the savings
rate. On the other, the stock of e ective capital will rise because of the de-
crease in the population, assuming the rest of the variables remain the same
(Lau, 2009; d’Albis, 2007). According to our simulations, the decrease in
disposable income has a greater impact than the negative population growth
rate and the longer life expectancy. However the disposable income e ect
does not fully explain the stock of capital in the new steady state. Most
likely, the baby boom - baby bust (demographic e ect), coupled with a gen-
erous welfare system (economic e ect), explain the path to the new steady
state. The aging of the population opens a second window of opportunity by
increasing the capital-to-labor ratio when baby boomers exit to retirement
(Mason and Lee, 2006). This demographic e ect counts for the increase
of the e ective capital from 2010 to 2040. The baby bust generation will
save less than the baby boomers. First, the baby bust generation expect
to be net receivers of inter-familial transfers, which increases consumption
(see Figure 4). Second, the increasing number of retirees raises the cost of
ﬁnancing the welfare state, which reduces the disposable income of the baby
bust generation. The combination of both e ects will progressively reduce
the productivity of labor until the new equilibrium is reached.
In the new steady state, the demands for real and life cycle wealth are
higher than those in 2000 (see Figure 6). Assuming technology will not
change, the increase in the capital-to-labor ratio will lead to a 2% decrease
in the real interest rate, and a subsequent increase in labor productivity.
Consequently, aggregate consumption will be greater in the ﬁnal steady
state than in 2000. The downside of Figure 6 is the progressive movement
to the left of the demand for life cycle wealth from 2050 up to the ﬁnal
steady state. This means that, from 2050 onwards, the standard of living (in
e ective units) of future generations will progressively decline; even though,
in aggregate terms, people in 2050 will be better o  than those in 2000.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the evolution of the stock of capital in Spain.
To that purpose, we have implemented a general equilibrium OLG model
that includes realistic public and familial transfers by age. The size and
direction of the observed Spanish intergenerational transfers draw upon the
National Transfer Accounts database (NTA), a new international database
that makes available estimates of marketable and non-marketable inter-
age ﬂows that are consistent with National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA).
25Provided the set of transfers by age in 2000 is maintained in the future,
the simulation results show a decrease in disposable income of 17% from
2010 to 2040, due to population aging. Nevertheless, asset holdings and
consumption, both in per capita terms, experience a temporary and consid-
erable increase. We show how the rapid increase in both variables is due to
the pronounced baby boom and baby bust in Spain. First, e ective capital
increases because the population at working ages decreases (even with mi-
gration), and because workers have access to a greater stock of productive
capital. This is known as the second demographic dividend (Mason and
Lee, 2006). Second, consumption per capita rises because of the increase in
transfer wealth. Thus, on the one hand, baby boomers beneﬁt from the cur-
rent Social Security system, receiving substantial beneﬁts relative to their
contributions. As a result, baby boomers exchange part of their savings
for consumption. On the other hand, the baby bust generation are deplet-
ing their capital because they have received a large quantity of inter-vivos
transfers from their parents (babyboomers), relative to the amounts they
will leave to their children.
In sum, the e ects of the Spanish baby boom and baby bust coupled
with the generous pension beneﬁts, will lead to a progressive decline in the
standard of living for those alive after 2040. Thus, salaries and e ective
capital will decrease, yielding lower aggregate consumption, higher interest
rates, and consequently a temporary second demographic dividend.
Further research is needed in order to explore the extent to which the re-
sults depend on the underlying model assumptions and the extent to which
the 2000 or future NTA estimates can be used to modify it. This paper has
taken the simplest possible approach as a starting point. Future research
could consider other saving motives and other forms of altruism that could
lead to more ﬂexible or endogenous transfers. Similarly considering endoge-
nous fertility and productivity growth would be other examples worth to
analyze.
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29A Calibration
This section presents the calibration process of tax proﬁles, social beneﬁts, pub-
lic expenditures, and inter- and intra-familial transfers using the Spanish NTA
database for year 2000. As shown in Table 2 (see numbers in brackets) around 70%
of the Spanish government budget is modeled (or 24.36% of the GDP), and there
are a great number of private transfers, including bequests. The calibration is done
in two steps. First, we try to replicate each age proﬁle. Second, public transfers
are adjusted to match the Spanish government budget in 2000. Meanwhile, private
transfers are adjusted to replicate the life cycle deﬁcit by age.
This section is organized as follows. First, the three variables exogenous to our
model are introduced: Spanish demography, age-speciﬁc labor productivity indexes,
and the labor-augmenting technological progress. A detailed explanation of the
source of information and the estimation process is given. Second, we proceed with
the calibration of the endogenous variables. Speciﬁcally, we present the formulae
used to model public and private consumption expenditures, taxes proﬁles, public
pension beneﬁts, and private transfers.
Table 2: UN SNA Classiﬁed Tax Revenues and Public Expenditures by
Function in 2000
Expenditures %GDP Revenues %GDP
Property income, payable 3.27 Taxes on production and imports 10.31
Social beneﬁts other that in kind 12.08 Taxes on production and imports 11.46 (6.22)
Pensions 10.18 Subsidies -1.14
Contributory 9.91 Property income, receivable 1.12
-Retirement 6.20 (6.30) Current taxes on income and wealth 10.25
-Disability 1.73 Taxes on income 9.84 (10.19)
-Survivors 1.87 (1.35) Individual income tax 6.70 (6.98)
-Maternity 0.11 (0.10) Corporate income tax 3.14 (3.21)
Non contributory 0.28 Other current taxes 0.41
Unemployment 1.38 Social contributions 12.99 (7.76)
Other social protection 0.52 Other current transfers 0.76
Other current transfers 1.27




Other (in-kind) 7.40 (6.96)
Saving, net 1.46
Total 35.43 (24.36) Total 35.43 (24.36)
A.1 The Spanish demography
In this section, we describe how population data are obtained so that they ﬁt our
Large-scale OLG model. In particular, we derive the population by employing a
population matrix by age and time, Leslie matrix, abstracting from gender di er-
ences. To improve the quality of the computations, both the initial and the ﬁnal
economic situations need to be in a steady state, which implies the need for a stable
population. This means that, in addition to the need to project a future population
30Table 3: Gross National Disposable Income, Spain in 2000
Consumption 77.54 Compensation of employees (CE) 49.98
Government ﬁnal consumption 17.35 Net CE from ROW -0.02
Private ﬁnal consumption 60.19 Operating surplus (OS) 40.90
Net Saving 8.68 Net prop and entrep income from ROW -1.12
Public saving 1.46 Indirect taxes less subsidies (NIT) 10.02
Private saving 7.23 NIT from ROW 0.29
Consumption of ﬁxed capital 13.78 Net current transfers from ROW -0.05
Total 100.00 Total 100.00
until its ﬁnal state we also need to obtain an initial steady state.20
Data availability imposes some constraints on the estimation process. First,
data on historical population are available from the Human Mortality Database
(2009) (HMD). This database contains population and mortality rates by age and
gender from 1908 to 2006. Nevertheless, even for this period, some adjustments are
needed. Some of them simply consist of smoothing some unrealistic peaks.21 Sec-
ond, the most important adjustments deal with the need to project past population
backwards from 1908 to the initial steady state. Third, and regarding the future,
the assumptions on the main demographic parameters are taken from the National
Statistic Institute (INE) and Eurostat. Fourth, fertility data are truncated in order
to satisfy the assumption that individuals start making decisions when they set up
their own household. Finally, we need to take into account that the model works
with representative agents, and does not distinguish by gender, which implies that
all parameters will need to be adjusted properly.
The process of obtaining a coherent evolution of past and future Spanish popu-
lation is as follows. The starting point is recovering the observed population for the
period 1908-2006. The second step is ﬁxing the mortality and fertility assumptions
in order to derive the direct and inverse population projection matrices. Estimation
methods are used to derive age-speciﬁc mortality rates (Lee and Carter, 1992) and
age-speciﬁc fertility rates (Lee, 1993), starting from the data available. Thus, we
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while mortality is a multiplicative process:
logm(t,x)=am
x + kt · bm
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t,x   i.i.d.(0, 2
 m). (A-2)
Future age-speciﬁc mortality rates are forecasted using the (Lee and Carter, 1992)
methodology. In order to reach a stable population, mortality rates are kept con-
stant from 2050 onwards, with a forecasted life expectancy at birth (total) of 86
20We deviate from many of the available large-scale OLG models for Spain, in that
our economy is in steady-state in 1870 rather than in 1960, capturing most of the Spanish
demographic transition features (R´ ıos-Rull, 2001; D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez and D´ ıaz-Saavedra, 2009;
Rojas, 2004, 2005).
21For the ﬁrst decades, until year 1960, an unrealistic peak is observed in the last age
of the decade. Hence a smoothing procedure is applied using inverse projection matrices.
31years, as Figure 7 shows. Mortality rates prior to 1908 are calculated by adjusting
the estimated values in Equation (A-2) to historical life expectancies reported in
Nicolau (2005). In the case of fertility, and regarding the past, observed age-speciﬁc
fertility for the period 1971-2007 are used to estimate Equation (A-1) and to pre-
dict past fertility, both for the rest of the observable period (1908-1971) and for
the projected past. Regarding the future, some additional information is available:
the INE projected age-speciﬁc fertility rates for the period 2002-2031. Using these
rates, a ﬁnal total fertility rate of 1.53 is reached in 2030, and remains constant


















































Figure 7: Spain: Life Expectancy at Birth and TFR, 1908-2050
Source: Author’s calculations using HMD and Eurostat.
Regarding migration assumptions, we also opt for the Eurostat assumptions.22
Table 4 shows the annual ﬂow of net immigrants assumed in the Eurostat population
projection. A similar procedure used to derive past mortality rates is used to
estimate annual ﬂow of net migrants by age from 2008 onwards (see Figure 8).
Hence, in line with Eurostat assumptions, future immigrants (the observed level is
taken until year 2008) are assumed to decrease, ﬁrst sharply until 2020, and later
more steadily. In order to have a stable population, we assume that the number of
migrants gradually decreases to zero from 2060 onwards (see Table 4).23
After collecting and estimating the necessary information, we project the pop-
ulation by single years of age using Leslie matrices (inverse population projection
in the case of the past). Figure 9 shows the population size over time for an open
22The last o cial projections derived by the National Statistics Institute (INE, 2005)
assumed in their baseline a gradual reduction in annual net immigrants, from the cur-
rent number of more than half million, to a constant value of 260.000 in 2060. A low
immigration hypothesis (tending to 100.000) was derived in order to produce an outcome
similar to past European projections (Eurostat 2006). The new Eurostat projection is
more realistic in the initial value of immigrants, but still assumes a lower long-term level.
23A stable population can also be reached if we assume a constant proportion of (net)
migrants by age over time. Nonetheless, the total number of migrants would still not
match with Eurostat assumptions.
32Table 4: Annual net immigrants (Eurostat population projections)
2008 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
623.4 540.2 375.8 263.1 190.4 160.8 149.3 150.5 146.1 135.2 131.8 129.9








































































Figure 8: Spain: Estimated Net Migrants by Age and Year, 1997-2050
Source: Author’s calculations based on HMD and Eurostat.
33and closed economy to migration since 1975.











































Figure 9: Spain: Historical and Projected Population Size from 1900 to 2100
Source: HMD, Eurostat, and author’s calculations.
A.2 Age-speciﬁc labor productivity indexes
We assume that age-speciﬁc labor productivity indexes do not change over time.
Di erences in labor income between generations are driven by two time components
(labor-augmenting technological progress and the marginal product of e ective la-
bor) as well as by changes in unemployment rates by age and time. Unemployment
rates draw from two sources: i) historical unemployment data from 1972 to 2009
are taken from the OECD database and ii) projected data from 2009 to 2060 draw
upon the Budgetary projections (baseline scenario 2008) of the European Policy
Committee. To introduce the dramatic decline in employment in years 2008-2009
in the analysis, and the expected slow recovery of the crisis, we have substituted
the forecasted unemployment rates for a linear interpolation by age of the unem-
ployment rates between year 2009 and year 2019. Age-speciﬁc labor productivity
indexes are obtained by taking “labor earnings” by age (including self-employment)
from Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) database for the period 1982
to 2006. The statistical method used to compute the age-speciﬁc labor productiv-
ity indexes is the singular value decomposition. In the following, the database and
estimation process is described.
A.2.1 The continuous working life sample (MCVL)
The MCVL is a sample extracted from Social Security administrative data.24 It is
comprised of 4% of all individuals registered with the Social Security administration
(both contributors and recipients of beneﬁts) over the sampling year. The dataset
24See MTAS (2006b) for a detailed description of the Muestra Continua de Vidas Lab-
orales (MCVL), available upon request at
http://www.seg-social.es/Internet 1/Estadistica/Est/index.htm.
34includes the entire life histories of the individuals selected that are contained in the
Social Security records.25 Thus, although it is not a pure panel, the dataset is rich
in longitudinal data. However, this feature complicates both the structure of the
information and the data selection, since the registration unit varies substantially
either by person (in the personal data ﬁle), or by contract (in the a liation ﬁle),
or by contract and year (in the contribution ﬁle). Furthermore, the quality of the
data is not homogenous, deteriorating as they go back in time. Speciﬁcally, the
data collection was initiated at di erent points in time: data on pensions were ﬁrst
included around 1996, data on contributions were introduced around 1980, while
some data on a liation (contract registering) are available from as early as 1970.
Clearly, all these factors condition our analysis.
Among the di culties that can arise in dealing with such a large administrative
dataset (the sample size reaches about a million people in 2005), the most chal-
lenging are dealing with empty contribution bases, on the one hand; and relating
contribution, a liation, and beneﬁts data for the same individual, on the other.
In particular, in order to extract reliable data regarding contributions in a speciﬁc
time unit, it is necessary to follow up all the contracts in which an individual has
been involved, computing time and contribution separately so as to avoid an er-
roneous correspondence between working time and contribution per unit of time.
Below we describe in detail how we dealt with this.
The annual contribution period, or working time, is obtained by recovering
all the contracts signed by the individual for each year, taking into account part-
time work, as well as the possibility that contracts may have run simultaneously.
At the same time, the average hourly contribution is obtained. One of the main
problems we faced was the existence of missing contribution data. This can occur
either within a contract registered in the contribution ﬁle, or due to a lack of corre-
spondence between the a liation data (starting long before 1980) and contribution
data (starting in 1980). For example, we might ﬁnd that, even after 1980, there
is no recorded contribution for one speciﬁc worker, while data regarding a liation
showed the worker to be actually contributing.26 An imputation process is devel-
oped to provide ﬁgures for the missing contributions. By tracking a liation and
contribution data, we treat missing values di erently depending upon whether the
individual is actually working (actual missing value) or not (if he is out of the la-
bor force). In the former case, data from the same individual are used in order to
recover absent contributions. If this is not available in the same year, the contract
is discarded. Once this imputation process is terminated, the average hourly wage
is obtained for each year and age.
25Workers, pensioners, and individuals receiving unemployment beneﬁts or beneﬁts prior
to early retirement are included. The latter can be identiﬁed by the type of relation they
have with the Social Security administration.
26Information regarding contributions was ﬁrst gathered in 1980, but it is more reliable
after 2001. The providers of the sample found that the share of contracts with missing
data fell from 78% in 1984 to 94% in 1992 and to 99% in 2003.
35A.2.2 Statistical calculation
Since the simulated outputs are in real terms, we calculated real labor earnings by
age using the IPC from INE.27 Then, assuming a multiplicative relation between
the time component and the age component, we use the singular value decomposi-
tion method to calculate age-speciﬁc labor productivity indexes (Sanchez-Romero,
2009).
Proof. Let Y =[ yt,x]t=1982...2006;x=Tw...Tr 1 be a matrix T   N of salaries by age
and time. Recall that the real salary is divided into a time component,  t = wtAt,
and an age component,  x, as follows
yt,x = wtAt x   yt,x =  t x.
Let deﬁne   =[  1, 2,..., T]  the vector of time components and e =[  1, 2,..., N] 
the vector of age component. Then, Y can be rewritten as






 1 1  1 2 ···  1 N












Let the singular value decomposition of the matrix of salaries be
YT N = UT T ·  T N · VN N. (A-4)
where U and V are basis of eigenvectors associated to matrices YY  and Y Y,
respectively. Using (A-3) and (A-4) we obtain the following equalities:
YY 
T T =   · e e ·    = U(   )U 
and
Y YN N = e ·     · e  = V (   )V.
However, by deﬁnition there is only one non-zero eigenvalue equal to one, that is
[ ]1,1 = 1 and [ ]t,x =0 , t  = 1 and x  = 1. Therefore, Y can be decomposed as
















Finally, as we are only interested in relative prices, the fact that e is weighted by  
    = 1 does not a ect our problem. Figure 10, below, reports the age-speciﬁc
labor productivity index by age, obtained using the singular value decomposition.
A.3 Labor-augmenting technological progress
The growth rate of the labor-augmenting technological progress from 1900 onwards


















27This step is not strictly necessary since the time component will capture this infor-
mation.
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Figure 10: Spain: Estimated Age-Speciﬁc Labor Productivity Index
where   is the capital share, y is the GDP per capita, and k is the stock of capital
per capita. The estimation of At is split into three periods: 1900-1969, 1970-2008,
2009-. First, for the 1970-2008 period, we have complete information from the
OECD database (www.oecd.org/statistics/productivity). Thus, we calculate: i)
the stock of capital using the time series of “Gross Fixed Capital Formation” and
the “Consumption of Fixed Capital”, ii) the average rate of depreciation of capital
from 1970 to 2008 (  =4.85%), and iii) the capital share (    0.36).28 Second, the
projection of labor productivity to the future (2009-) is the same as that of the
European Policy Committee (2009). Third, for the period before 1970, we use the
Spanish GDP per capita from Maddison (2006) and we take the stock of capital
from Mas et al. (1995) and Cubel and Palafox (1997). Finally, we derive At by
combining the labor productivity,  , our forecasted Spanish population, and our
estimated total employment for the same period. Figure 11 shows our estimated
At from 1970 to 2040.
A.4 Public and private consumption proﬁles
We assume that parents ﬁnance the consumption of their children up to the age
at which they become economically independent. We assume that consumption is
comprised of three main items: health {h}, education {e}, and others {o}, which
can be ﬁnanced publicly or privately. To calculate the equivalent adult consumer
units (EAC) in expenditure j at age x, we divide the consumption of the individual
in expenditure j at age x by the mean consumption (others) of his/her parent in
2000.
Let the empirical distribution function of children born in year t x from parents





ˆ ft x,z, where s  X = {Tw,...,  1}. For
notational convenience we split the set X into two meaningful demographic sets:
working years (L) and retirement years (R).
28Our estimated values of   and   are very similar to those obtained by R´ ıos-Rull (2001)
(  = 4%,   =0 .36).

































































Figure 11: Growth rate of the labor-augmenting technological progress:
Spain, 1970-2040.













t,s+x if x  X.
(A-7)
We estimate EAC units for public expenditures on health, education, and others in













t,s+x if x  X.
(A-8)
A.5 Taxes proﬁles
We assume that the government runs a balanced budget, in which payroll taxes











 tAt xdNt(x), (A-9)
and taxes on production and income (corporate income tax and individual income
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1    cKt. (A-10)














































Figure 12: Equivalent Adult Consumer Units by Expenditure
Note: Private consumption (thick black solid line) is the sum of  h
x +  e
x +  o
x. The
public health proﬁle (thin black solid line) has been extended up to age 100 using an
exponential function, whereas the remaining public proﬁles are assumed constant
from age 90 to age 100. Source: NTA Spain (2000), HMD and Eurostat.
In order to maintain a balanced budget over time, the government changes taxes
on production whenever public consumption expenditures (G) are not covered by
taxes on income.
In Spain, the individual income tax is a progressive tax. Thus we assume the
following progressive tax formula:
 I(T
y
t,x)=Ia + Ib · (T
y
t,x   1), (A-11)
where Ty
x is the taxable income at age x relative to the net labor income at age
25. Thus, if taxable income equals net labor income at age 25, then the individual
income tax rate is Ia and the marginal tax rate is Ib.
The tax parameters { c, I} have been chosen so as to replicate as closely as
possible the items contained in the 2000 Spanish Government Budget in Table 2.
The remaining taxes are endogenously determined. The production tax is calcu-
lated using Equation (A-10). Table 2 shows how the di erence between actual
taxes on production and imports of 11.46%, and simulated taxes on production (in
parenthesis) of 11.04%, is only .42% of the GDP. The di erence between the actual
and simulated social contributions is higher because it is calculated so as to ﬁnance
the contributory pension beneﬁts modeled (retirement, survivors, and maternity).
Thus, we are modeling up to 62.50% of all social contributions.
A.6 Contributory pension beneﬁts proﬁles
Social beneﬁts in 2000 represented more than 12% of the Spanish GDP. Social
beneﬁts are comprised of contributory and non-contributory pensions, or 9.91%
and 0.28% of GDP, respectively; unemployment, or 1.38% of GDP; and other so-
cial protections, or 0.52% of GDP. We have modeled contributory retirement and
39Table 5: Values for the ﬁxed tax parameters in 2000
Parameter Value
Corporate Income Tax  c 9.6%
Individual Income Tax Ia 1.80%
Ib 3.84%
widowhood beneﬁts based on the Spanish Social Security rules, as well as on con-
tributory maternity beneﬁts.
As with the tax parameters, the beneﬁt parameters have been calibrated to
match not only the percentage of the expenditure with respect to the GDP, but
also each beneﬁt age proﬁle.
Table 6: Values for the ﬁxed tax parameters in 2000
Parameter Value
Number of years of contribution Nb 15
Retirement beneﬁt  r 53%
Maternity beneﬁt  m 10%
                       
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    




























              
             
             
                    
                   
                   
Figure 13: Spain, NTA and Simulated Public Beneﬁts in 2000
Source: NTA Spain (2000), HMD and Eurostat.
A.6.1 maternity beneﬁt
The maternity beneﬁt is temporary and proportional to the (annual) salary. Let
the fraction of the salary received by a parent of a recently born child be denoted
40by  m. Thus, we model this beneﬁt as a fraction of the salary of those people who
have children during the current year.
bm
t,x =  m tAt x(1   ut,x) ˆ ft,x for x  X. (A-12)
where ˆ ft,x is the age-speciﬁc fertility rate of an individual of age x in year t.29
A.6.2 retirement beneﬁt
The Spanish government runs an unfunded deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan. Retire-
ment beneﬁts after retirement depend on the (real) mean salary of the last 15 (Nb)
years. Moreover, retirement beneﬁts are adjusted for inﬂation, thus after retirement
(real) beneﬁts remain constant. Then, the pension beneﬁt formula applied in this





Tr 1  
z=Tr Nb
 t x+zAt x+z z(1   ut x+z,z) for x  R, (A-13)
where Tr is the mean age at retirement and  r is the correction factor for early
retirement.
A.6.3 widowhood beneﬁt
Widow beneﬁts are established as a proportion of the pension rights accumulated





lt x+50,50   lt,x
lt x+50,50
for x  R. (A-14)
where lt,x is the probability that an individual survives from birth to age x in year
t.
A.7 Private Transfers
We divide private transfers into transfers made within the household (intra-household),
and transfers from one household to another (inter-household). The NTA database
contains detailed information on transfers made to and received from members liv-
ing in the same household; e.g., working children, spouses, and parents. Here, the
only transfers modeled as intra-household correspond to (net) transfers made from
parents to their children while they are younger than Tw years old. Once their
children have set up their own household, parents will continue making transfers to
their children; however, these transfers will be then considered inter-household.
A.7.1 Intra-household transfers
In this model, parents pay for their children’s consumption needs while they are
younger than Tw years old. The consumption of a child of age x is assumed to be
29The age-speciﬁc fertility rate is truncated so that it aligns with the assumption that
children do not make any decisions.
41a fraction  x of the adult’s consumption (measured in units of EAC). Hence, the
cost of childrearing for the head of household depends not only on the number of
surviving children, but also on their ages. To simplify our notation, we have opted
to summarize the number of EAC within a household whose head is x years old in
year t using  t,x. Its mathematical expression is given by






lt,x s ˆ ft x+s,sIx s<Tw. (A-15)
where I is an index function that takes a value of one when the inequality is satisﬁed
and zero otherwise.
Equation (A-15) also takes into account the number of orphans who are raised
within the cohort. This fact can easily be seen multiplying (A-15) by the size of
the cohort. After some rearrangements, we derive that  t,xNt,x equals the size of
the cohort, plus the total number of dependent children raised within the cohort,
in EAC units, regardless whether their parents are alive or not; i.e., if they are
orphans and or non-orphans. Moreover, Equation (A-15) guarantees that we are
taking into account the whole population in EAC units by summing  t,xNt,x across
age.
A.7.2 Inter-household transfers
We assumed that inter-household transfers are only received by children older than
Tw. Then, let us deﬁne ot,x as the number of (adult) surviving o spring older than




Nt x+s,s ˆ ft x+s,s
Nt,x
lt,x s · Ix s Tw. (A-16)
Multiplying (A-16) by the cohort size and summing across age gives the total num-
ber of people older than Tw who still have a parent alive. Deﬁning this variable with
such detail is important for two reasons. First, the bequest received by any individ-
ual will depend on the number of siblings eligible to hold assets. Thus, the oldest
o spring is more likely to receive bequests than her/his younger siblings when the
life expectancy is low. On the other hand, if we assume that bequests are shared
equally among siblings, we expect that the youngest sibling will be better o  with
longer life expectancies. The increase in consumption is bigger, the younger the
individual who receives the bequests. Second, holding bequests constant, o spring
who belong to big families receive smaller assets than those in smaller families.
Bequests
Here, rather than taxing the unintentional bequest at all ages and spreading it
out among those who are Tw years old or among members of the same cohort, we
assume that surviving o spring inherit their parents’ wealth. Then, the “expected”














42where qt,x is the probability of dying between age x and x+1 among cohort members
alive at age x, pt,x is the probability of surviving between age x and x + 1 among
cohort members alive at age x, and at,x is the assets at age x in year t. The second
term of Equation (A-17) takes into account the fact that individuals under 42 years
old, or 2Tw, cannot leave their stock of assets to their children.
Equation (A-17) says that the amount of bequest to be inherited is positively
related to the parent’s wealth and the parent’s mortality risk, and negatively related
to the number of siblings.
Inter-vivos transfers
According to actual Spanish NTA data, elderly parents are (net) ﬁnancial support-
ers of their o spring, even when they are retired. An international comparison using
NTA shows a similar result. In addition, countries where public transfers ﬁnance
a greater proportion of the life cycle deﬁcit at age 65 and over also have greater
private downward transfers. In order to capture this last feature, we introduce an







For simplicity we assume that
 t,x =
  · TGt,x
TGt,x + ABRt,x
for x  R, (A-19)
where   is an adjustment factor that we estimate to be close to 0.5.
Finally, according to the data, we assume that the amount of money transferred
from each elderly person to her or his children is proportional to the public pension
beneﬁts received (widowhood and retirement),






for x  R. (A-20)
which implies that workers x  {Tw,...,Tr   1} in year t will receive an expected
transfer from their retired parents equal to
 t,x =
  1 x  
s=Tw











Thus, Equation (A-21) implies that children with older parents will consume more
than children with younger parents, assuming the other variables are equal. This
is because the transfer of wealth is greater for children with older parents than for
children with younger parents, since the latter group receive inter-vivos transfers
later in life.
B Computational Details
To simplify notation, age and time indexes are removed, while the next period is
denoted by “ ”. In the following, we use the notation R+ to represent R+  {0}.
43B.1 Household Problem
The head of the household at age x  X aims in year t  T = {t0,t 0 +1,...,T} to
maximize her expected utility by choosing the optimal consumption and assets in
period t + 1. The Bellman equation for the head of the household reads as
v(t,x,a|A) = max
c,a  { u(c)+ pv(t +1 ,x+1 ,a  |A )}, (A-22)
with   equal to 0.99 and a relative risk aversion coe cient (  =1 .76) associated




(1 + ˜ r)(a + h) + (1    i)(1    ss)yl + bm +     (1 +  p) c if x  L,
(1 + ˜ r)(a + h) + (1    i)
 
B {m} b +     (1 +  p) c if x  R,
(A-23)
and the boundary conditions
c>0,a  0, with a·,Tw = a·,  =0 . (A-24)
where ˜ r is the after-tax (real) interest rate,   is the number of equivalent adult
consumers in the household, pt,x   [0,1) is the probability of surviving to age
x + 1 in year t + 1 conditional on being alive at age x in year t, h is the bequest
received,  i is the personal income tax rate,  ss is the payroll tax rate,  p is the
consumption tax rate, yl is the average gross salary by age (or yl =  A (1   u)), b
is the public beneﬁts received (maternity, retirement, widowhood),   is other (net)
interhousehold transfers received, a denotes asset holdings, and A is the labor-
augmenting technological progress.
Let deﬁne G(a,a |I) as the function of total amount of consumption goods
obtainable for any combination of assets held at any t and t + 1, given the in-
formation I at t, which depends upon the age of the individual and other time
dependent and independent variables {r, ,h,u,A, , , i, ss, p,{bj}j B, }  I,
then I   X   R12
+   R. That is,




(1 + ˜ r)(a + h)   a  + (1    i)(1    ss)yl + bm +  
 




(1 + ˜ r)(a + h)   a  + (1    i)
 
B {m}b + 
 
if x  R.
(A-25)
Let deﬁne the set C   R+  R+ as the region of pairs (a,a )   R2
+ where con-
sumption is nonnegative; that is, C = {(a,a )   R2
+ : G(a,a |I)   0, for any given I}.
It is easy to prove that C is a convex set. Now, using (A-25) let us rewrite the
Bellman equation as
v(t,x,a|A) = max
a  { u(G(a,a |I)) +  pv(t +1 ,x+1 ,a  |A )}. (A-26)
The algorithm operates on (A-26) for all individuals in each year up to the
point at which the model converges. The algorithm involves the following steps:
1. Deﬁne a time-independent grid for assets, with ||ai+1 ai|| su ciently small,
Ga = {a1 =0 ,a 2,a 3,...,an}, (A-27)
44where an is the maximum realization of assets weighted by units of e ective
labor.
2. Deﬁne the correspondence f : Ga   Ga of optimal combinations of assets
in t and t + 1 at age x.
f(ak|I,A )=a 
j = argmaxaj { u(G(ak,a j|I)) +  pv(t +1 ,x+1 ,a j|A )},
(A-28)
where I   I and A    R+ is the productivity in year t + 1. Note that f has
a one-to-one correspondence given that C is a convex set and u(·) is strictly
concave.
3. Calculate the set {(ak,f(ak|I,A ))}n
k=1   C2n of all possible optimal asset
pairs for the household head in year t. Evaluate Equation (A-26) by intro-
ducing all optimal asset pairs. Repeat this process for the entire life cycle of
the head of the household.
4. Repeat step 3 for all households.
5. Given the initial boundary conditions, we know that wealth at the beginning
of adulthood is zero, or at,Tw = a1   Ga,  t  T . Therefore, given all
information sets over the life cycle of the head of the household and Equation
(A-28), we iterate forward on age and time to get the optimal path of asset
holdings.
6. Repeat step 5 for all individuals.
B.2 Aggregate Model
In this model, the equilibrium price vector is numerically obtained using a Taton-
nement; see Judd (1998).
The simulation strategy was to calculate the demand and supply of capital at
all times for a given vector of interest rates {ri
t}T
t=t0, with T su ciently large and
i denoting the i-th iteration, such that there is no excess of demand of capital at
any time. The information set prior to the simulation is a vector of time-invariant
parameters, demographic characteristics, and degrees of technological progress for
t  T . In order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, the phase-in (out)
period begins (ﬁnishes) with a stable population 200 years before (after) the period
being analyzed, so that the economy before and after the demographic transition
is in a steady-state equilibrium. The algorithm is divided into the following seven
steps:
1. Choose a dumping factor of   =0 .2 and a tolerance   equal to 0.01.
2. Make an initial guess {R0
t}T
t=t0, where Ri
t is equal to ri
t +   for all i   N, in
which the initial and ﬁnal steady-state interest rates are included.
3. Given the initial guess, use a Cobb-Douglas production function to calculate
its associated salary over time in units of e ective labor
 i





   
  1
, t  T . (A-29)
454. Compute the household problem and aggregate assets across all household
heads to determine the capital stock per units of e ective labor
 t =
   1
x=Tw at,xNt,x
 Tr 1
x=Tw At x(1   ut,x)Nt+1,x+1
, t  T , (A-30)
5. Next, determine the marginal product of capital resulting from (A-30), that
is
rn
t +   =   
  1
t , t  T . (A-31)
6. If ||ri   rn|| <  then STOP.
7. Otherwise, compute a new vector of interest rates and salaries
r
i+1
t = (1    )ri








t +  
 
   
  1
, t  T . (A-33)
8. Calculate a new set of public beneﬁts {bi
t,x}i B and public goods {g
j
t,x}i J
for all x  X and t  T according to equations (A-8)-(A-14).
9. Calculate payroll taxes ({ ss
t }t T ) and consumption tax rates ({ 
p
t }t T ) such
that (A-9) and (A-10) are satisﬁed.
10. Compute the set of inter-household transfers: bequests and inter-vivos trans-
fers according to Equations (A-17) and (A-20)-(A-21), respectively.
Then go to step 4.
46C Data Sources
Table 7: Data sources used in National Transfers Accounts age proﬁles
Age proﬁles Data source
Lifecycle deﬁcit (LCD)
Private consumption
Private health consumption (CF) INE: Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (ECPF), 2000
Private education (CFH) INE: ECPF, 2000
Private housing (CFR) INE: ECPF, 2000
Other private consumption (CFX) INE: ECPF, 2000
Public consumption
Public health consumption (CG) MSC: Estad´ ıstica del Gasto Sanitario P´ ublico, 2002
MSC: Encuesta Nacional de Salud, 1997
Public education (CGH) MEC: Estad´ ıstica de Ense˜ nanzas no Universitarias
MEC: Estad´ ıstica del Gasto P´ ublico en Educaci´ on
INE: Estad´ ıstica de la Ense˜ nanza Superior en Espa˜ na
Other public consumption (CGX) Per capita
Labour Income (YL) Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
Self-employed (YLS) Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
Earnings (YLE) Eurostat: EU Household Planel, 2000
Public transfers (outﬂows)
Social Security contributions Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
Personal income tax Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 1998
Capital tax Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
Value-added tax (VAT) INE: ECPF, 2000
Property tax INE: ECPF, 2000
Excise taxes (except tobacco) INE: ECPF, 2000
Excise tax on tobacco INE: ECPF, 2000
Public transfers (inﬂows)
Contributory pensions (retirement, disability, MTAS: Informe Estad´ ıstico del INSS, 2000
widowhood, survivors)
Non-contributory pensions (retirement, disability); MTAS: Anuario de Estad´ ısticas Laborales y Asuntos Sociales, 2000
unemployment and temporary disability beneﬁts
Social Security family beneﬁts MTAS: Informe Estadstico del INSS, 2000
Health beneﬁts (hospital and primary care, pharmaceuticals) MSC: Encuesta Nacional de Salud, 1997
Education expenditure MEC: Estad´ ıstica de Ense˜ nanzas no Universitarias;
MEC: Estad´ ıstica del Gasto P´ ublico en Educaci´ on;
INE: Estad´ ıstica de la Ense˜ nanza Superior en Espa˜ na
Long-term care CIS: Encuesta sobre la soledad de las personas
mayores, 1998
Private transfers
Interhousehold transfers (inﬂows) Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
Interhousehold transfers (outﬂows) INE: ECPF, 2000
Intrahousehold transfers (in/outﬂows) Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
INE: ECPF, 2000
Asset Based Reallocations
Asset income proﬁles Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
Interest proﬁles Eurostat: EU Household Panel, 2000
Note: See Lee and Mason (2010a) and the chapter for Spain for further
details about the methodology and data sources.
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